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against him, and forcing the defense to file
motions to suppress prior to trial. Second,
the ruling clearly lays out a three step analysis for the trial court to follow in evaluating possible discovery violations under the
rule.
- Lori S. Simpson

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.lmrex Company,
Inc.: THE SUPREME COURT GIVES
ITS APPROVAL TO THE USE OF
THE CIVIL RICO PROVISIONS

again, made reference to the scope provision of Rule 74 1(a)(3), noting that in reenactment the provision had been moved
from subsection (a)(3) to subsection (g) and
now reads "obligations of the State's Attorney under this Rule." Md. Rule 4-263(g)
(emphasis added). "This change merely
presents more clearly the intent of the
predecessor, Md. Rule 741(a) and does
not represent an enlargement of the obligations of a State's Attorney in furnishing
disclosure." 303 Md. at 651, 496 A.2d
at 668.
Finally, the state argued that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to admit Officer Jenkin's testimony
and in permitting prosecutor's reference to
it in his opening remarks. Alternatively,
the state claimed that if there was error, it
was not prejudicial. The court, once again,
rejected this contention, drawing an analogy between this case and Colter v. State,
297 Md. 423,466 A.2d 1286 (1983). Colter
involved the portion of the discovery rule
dealing with the identity of alibi witnesses
and rebuttal-to-alibi witnesses. The court
held that the practice of the judge excluding testimony from these nondisclosed
witnesses was an abuse of discretion. In
the instant case, however, the trial judge
ruled there was no discovery violation, the
question was never reached as to what
sanction, if any, should be applied. The
court went on to explain that there was a
discovery violation in this case and whether
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or not it was prejudicial, turns on two
things. The first is whether Bailey would
have moved to suppress upon obtaining
the statements; the second is whether that
motion to suppress would have been successful.
Based on the above reasoning, the court
remanded the case without affirmance or
reversal, mandating that the trial court
undertake a process potentially involving
three steps. First, the trial judge will realize that there was a discovery violation. He
shall consider the defendant's objection as
of the time it was made and then determine
the appropriate remedy. If exclusion is the
proper remedy, then a new trial will be
granted. If exclusion is not necessary, then
the judge proceeds to step two.
Next, a suppression hearing should be
held if the defendant moves to suppress on
other grounds. At that hearing, a determination of whether to exclude or not must
be made. Again, if exclusion is the appropriate remedy a new trial must be granted.
Step three involves the determination of
prejudice. If exclusion was not the appropriate remedy in the suppression hearing,
the state must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice or
the judge shall grant a new trial.
The court's holding in Bailey serves two
purposes. First, it furthers the rationale
behind Md. Rule 4-263; that of requiring
the state to disclose statements, therefore
apprising the defendant of the evidence

In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company,
Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985), the Supreme
Court examined the utilization of the privare civil action provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968 (1970). The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit and may serve to greatly expand
the use of the private civil action provisions ofRICO.
In 1979, Sedima, a Belgian corporation,
entered into a joint venture agreement
with Imrex to provide electronic components to another Belgian corporation.
Under the terms of the agreement, the
buyer was to order the parts through Sedima, and then Imrex was to obtain the
parts in this country and ship them to
Europe. The net proceeds were to be split
between Sedima and Imrex. However, Sedima became convinced that Imrex was
presenting inflated bills, thereby cheating
Sedima out of its fair share of the proceeds
by collecting for nonexistent expenses.
In 1982, Sedima filed suit in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of
New York against Imrex, setting forth
several common law claims. In addition,
Sedima filed claims under the civil action
provisions of RICO, pursuant to § 1964(c).
Two counts alleged violations of§ 1962(c),
based on the predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud. The third count alleged a conspiracy to violate § 1962(c).
The district court dismissed the RICO
counts for failure to state a claim. The
court held the requirement of § 1964(c)
that the jury be "by reason of a violation of
section 1962", means that it must be different in kind from the direct injury resulting from the predicate acts of racketeering
activity. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). The court further held the complaint must allege a "RICO-type injury",
which was some type of distinct racketeering or competitive injury. Id. at 965.
The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision

in determining that Sedima's complaint
was defective in two regards. Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc., 741
F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984). The first defect,
according to the court, was that the complaint failed to allege an injury "by reason
ofa violation of section 1962." The court
determined that the intent of Congress
was to compensate victims of organized
crime and not to provide additional remedies for injuries which were already compensable. The court also found the complaint to be defective because it failed to
allege that the defendants had already been
criminally convicted of the predicate acts
of mail and wire fraud, or of a RICO violation. In reaching its conclusion, the court
indicated its distress at the "extraordinary,
if not outrageous" uses to which the private civil action provisions of RICO have
been put. !d. at 487.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, reversed the decision of the lower
court. Justice White, writing the majority
decision, found two basic reasons for the
Court's holding. First, he determined that
there is no requirement that a private civil
action under § 1964(c) may only be implemented against a defendant who has previously been convicted of a predicate act or
of a RICO violation. Second, the Court
found no requirement that in order for a
plaintiff to proceed under § 1964(c), it
must first establish a "racketeering injury",
not merely an injury resulting from the
predicate acts themselves.
The Supreme Court found numerous
reasons for rejecting the requirement that
a private civil action could only be maintained against a defendant who has already
been convicted of a predicate act, or of a
RICO violation. First, the Court examined
the statutory language of the RICO Act
and determined it gave no such indication.
The Court noted the term "conviction"
does not appear in any relevant part of the
statute. It was also noted the definition of
"racketeering activity" does not include
acts for which the defendant has been convicted, but rather acts for which he could
be convicted. Second, the Court examined
the legislative history of the Act and found
that if Congress had intended to impose
such a requirement, there would have been
some mention of it there. Finally, the
Court determined such a requirement
would be inconsistent with Congress' policy concerns by severely handicapping potential plaintiffs and by only allowing actions to be brought against those persons
who had already been brought to justice.
In reaching its conclusion that a plaintiff
must first establish a "racketeering injury"
and not merely an injury resulting from
the predicate acts themselves, the Court
Y

relied primarily upon an interpretation of
the statutory language. It was determined
the language of the statute belies the requirement that there must be a "racketeering injury" which is separate from the
harm caused by the predicate acts. Justice
White set forth the following elements involved in a violation of section 1962(c),
which must be alleged by the plaintiff in
order to state a claim: (1) conduct, (2) of an
enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of
racketeering activity. The Court held any
damages occurring due to a violation of
section 1962(c) will flow from the commission of the predicate acts.
In one dissenting opinion Justice Powell
expressed his "disagreement with the
Court's conclusion that the statute must be
applied to authorize the types of private
civil actions now being brought frequently
against respected businesses to redress
ordinary fraud and breach of contract
cases." !d. at 3288 (1. Powell dissenting).
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice
Marshall disagreed with the majority's
reading of the statute. He stated that, "I
believe that the statutory language and history discloses a narrower interpretation of
the statute that fully effectuates Congress'
purposes, and that does not make compensable under civil RICO a host ofclaims
that Congress never intended to bring

within RICO's purview." !d. at 3293 (1.
Marshall dissenting).
RICO was developed as an aggressive
step on the part of Congress to supplement
the existing remedies and to develop new
methods for fighting crime, particularly
organized crime. For a number of years
after its enactment, RICO was used primarily to deal with organized crime and its
private civil action provisions were generally ignored. However, beginning in the
1980's these provisions began to develop
in a rapid manner. Although the Supreme
Court recognized the private civil action
provisions of RICO have evolved into
something quite different from the original concept of Congress, the Court has accepted this evolution. According to Justice
White, the fact that RICO has been applied in situations which were not anticipated by Congress demonstrates the breadth
of the Act, not necessarily the Act's ambiguity. The logical conclusion that can be
drawn from this decision is that, barring a
change of heart by the Supreme Court, the
private civil action provisions of RICO
will become more frequently used and
provide an additional cause of action for
those persons who may otherwise have
only been able to bring common law claims.

-Marc Minkove
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